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P
olitics, business and academic finance are
currently discussing the introduction of a
financial transaction tax, in which jurisdictions
the tax would be implemented – worldwide,
within the European Union, in the eurozone
excluding London, or at the national level
only – as well as its possible design. The politi-
cal message is clear: beyond party lines, there is
a willingness to introduce this tax. This is also
displayed by the jointly approved statement 
of the Bundesrat’s Finance Committee on the
related draft directive of the EU Commission.
At this point, I would like to note that, in prin-
ciple, I support the request for introducing a tax
on financial transaction. However, this must be
introduced such that in the future financial
business can and will take place in German and
European financial centers. Hence, the State
Government of Hessen only considers a finan-
cial transaction tax to be appropriate and mean-
ingful if it is introduced at least throughout the
whole European Union – thus, including the
financial center of London. Any other decision
would damage Germany’s single most signifi-
cant financial center – Frankfurt and the Rhine-
Main region – in an indefensible way.
Furthermore, the question of how such a tax
should be constructed has slipped a little into
the background. In my experience, tax systems
and laws only prove of value if they are
designed with reference to the practical experi-
ence of taxation – otherwise the floodgates are
opened for tax shifting and avoidance and 
ultimately the tax hits the wrong parties.
Therefore, tax shifting and avoidance by way 
of other financial centers or through product
innovation should effectively be rendered
impossible. Otherwise, the long-term disad-
vantages for financial centers, market partici-
pants and investors, and finally for the state,
will be greater than the benefits from the tax
revenues raised. I think all involved parties
agree on this point. 
Financial transaction today can be moved 
without difficulty from one place to another.
Accordingly, a financial transaction tax must
work effectively against the transfer of business
to third countries and against tax avoidance.
For this purpose, the EU Commission has opted
for the taxation of transactions by EU-based
entities in third countries. However, in my
opinion, this approach fails in that there is no
effective means of collecting this tax in a third
country. Hence, this approach is also no effec-
tive weapon against the transfer of business.
Yet, from the perspective of a financial center
this is of central importance.  
Finally, the current diversity of financial
instruments – especially with respect to de  riva  -
  tives – makes it more difficult for the tax law
legislator to determine the correct taxable
base. However, the taxable base and tax rate
together define the tax and are the starting
point for tax shifting. The differentiation
between market value and nominal value as
well as between two tax rates proposed by the
EU Commission does not do justice here.
Rather, they invite more tax avoidance. 
There are still some enormous obstacles
standing in the way of a functioning system of 
taxation for a financial transaction tax. We
have put forward a whole series of points and
proposed amendments to the draft directive of
the Commission. However, it seems to me that
an agreement on suggested viable solutions 
is not in sight. Indeed, poorly conceived solu-
tions are of more harm than use to Germany.
FINANCIAL TRANSACTION TAX – YES, BUT HOW?
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he failure of economists to predict
the 2008/2009 recession has generated
much criticism regarding the state of
macroeconomic forecasting and model-
ing. Against this background, we investi-
gate the accuracy and heterogeneity of
output growth and inflation forecasts
during the five most recent U.S. reces-
sions. We generate forecasts from six dif-
ferent models of the U.S. economy and
compare them to predictions from pro-
fessional forecasters. Both – models and
professionals – failed to predict the finan-
cial crisis and earlier recessions, but
recoveries are predicted well once the
turning point is reached. 
In recent years, researchers (e.g. Edge et al.
2010) have reported encouraging findings
regarding the forecasting performance of
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models. However, the existing papers are based
on samples with long periods and cannot
address specifically how well DSGE model-
based forecasts perform during recessions and
recoveries. Therefore, we analyze the per-
formance and also the heterogeneity of model
and expert forecasts around the five most
recent U.S. recessions. Turning points pose the
greatest challenge for economic forecasters,
are of most importance for policy makers, and
can help us to understand the current limita-
tions of economic forecasting. Furthermore,
expectations, and particularly the hetero  -
geneity of expectations which can itself be a
source of macroeconomic fluctuations, can
have an influence on the length and depths of
recessions (e.g. Kurz 2011). 
STRUCTURAL FORECASTS
Among the six models considered in this paper
are three small-scale New Keynesian models, a
non-structural Bayesian vector autoregression
model, and two medium-scale DSGE models
of the type currently used by leading central
banks. The advantage of structural models
over purely statistical forecasting approaches is
the information about structural sources of the
projections that are crucial to interpret the
forecasts. For each forecast, we re-estimate all
models using exactly the data as it was available
for professional forecasters. Using these histori-
cal data vintages is crucial to ensure compara-
bility to historical forecasts by professionals.
To our knowledge, there exists no comparable
assessment of the forecasting accuracy of mul-
tiple structural macroeconomic models with
historical data vintages. Furthermore, this paper
is the first attempt to quantify the heterogeneity
of model forecasts and compare them to sur-
vey forecasts in order to learn more about 
the extent, dynamics and sources of forecast 
heterogeneity.
FORECASTING ACCURACY
Figure 1 shows forecasts for annualized quar-
terly real output growth for the recent crisis.
The black line shows real-time data until the
forecast starting point and revised data after-
wards. The grey lines show forecasts collected
in the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF),
and the red line shows their mean. Model fore-
casts are shown in blue. To put the models on
an equal footage in terms of information with
the forecasts of experts, we condition their
forecasts on the mean estimate of the current
state of the economy from the SPF. The fore-
casts shown in the left graph start in the third
quarter of 2008 and have been computed
before the collapse of Lehman brothers. All
professional forecasters failed to foresee the
THE DIVERSITY OF FORECASTS FROM MACROECONOMIC MODELS OF
THE U.S. ECONOMY
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not have performed any better. Also, they are
similar to the more optimistic half of profes-
sional forecasters. In the fourth quarter of
2008, following the Lehman debacle, profes-
sional forecasters drastically revised their
assessments of the current state of the econo-
my downwards. Still, growth turned out to be
even much lower than estimated. Professional
forecasters as well as model forecasts wrongly
predicted that the trough had already been
reached. However, from the first quarter of
2009 onwards model-based and SPF forecasts
perform quite well in predicting the recovery
of the U.S. economy.
The paper includes a detailed analysis of fore-
casts during four additional recessions. Looking
at individual forecasts from the SPF, we
observe that the precision of the different
model forecasts is well in line with the preci-
sion range of forecasts from professionals. The
mean forecast of all six models exhibits some-
what greater errors than mean SPF forecasts.
However, this difference is surprisingly small
considering that the models only take into
account few macroeconomic variables, while
professional forecasters can also review vast
amounts of financial and survey data. The dif-
ference between the accuracy of model and
expert forecasts decreases with the forecast
horizon. Structural models are therefore suit-
able for medium-term forecasts, while expert
forecasts incorporate additional information
that helps improve near-term forecasts.
However, for practical policy usage, medium-
term horizon forecasts might be of more inter-
est due to the lag in policy transmission.
Among the structural models, there is none that
consistently outperforms the others. Overall, the
two medium-scale DSGE models deliver fairly
good forecasts in almost all analyzed recessions,
while the smaller models show a mixed per-
formance. The medium-scale DSGE models have
a rich economic structure and consider more
observable data series than the other models. At
the same time, their parameterization is parsi-
monious enough to yield accurate forecasts.
FORECAST HETEROGENEITY 
Empirical studies have documented substantial
variations in the accuracy and heterogeneity of
expert forecasts. Theoretical research has
emphasized that expectational heterogeneity
itself can be an important propagation mecha-
nism for economic fluctuations. Forecast hetero-
geneity arises for several reasons. The particular
modeling assumptions embedded in the fore-
casting model represent an important source of
expectation heterogeneity. In addition, the infor-
mation sets used by forecasters may differ in
terms of the number of economic variables or
the timeliness of data. The underlying modeling
assumptions, information sets and parameter
estimates of SPF forecasts are not publicly avail-
able. Instead, we use the six forecasting models
to investigate the impact of these three factors on
forecast precision and heterogeneity. The extent
of forecast heterogeneity is similar for model and
professional forecasts, but varies substantially
over time. These time variations are somewhat
similar for model-based and professional fore-
casts. The diversity in model forecasts can be
traced to different modeling assumptions, infor-
mation sets and parameter estimates. The simi-
larities of the heterogeneity of model-based and
professional forecasts can be taken as a first indi-
cation that much of the observed time variation
in forecast heterogeneity may be explained by
disagreement about appropriate modeling
assumptions, different information sets and dif-
ferences in parameter estimates, rather than irra-
tionality on the part of professional forecasters.
REFERENCES
Edge, R., Kiley, M., Laforte, J.-P. (2010)
“A Comparison of Forecast Performance between
Federal Reserve Staff Forecasts, Simple Reduced
Form Models, and a DSGE Model”,
Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol. 25,
Issue 4, pp. 720-754 
Kurz, M. (2011, ed.)
“Symposium on the Role of Market Belief in
Economic Dynamics”,
Economic Theory, Vol. 47, Issue 2-3 
The full article was published in 
Economic Theory, Vol. 47/2011, Issue 2-3, 
pp. 247-292 
and is available at:
www.volkerwieland.com/docs/Wieland-
Wolters-Revised-May19-2010.pdf
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Figure 1: Forecasts for the 2008/2009 recession
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I
n addition to the increasingly apparent
failures of financial institutions and mar-
kets, the crisis has demonstrated an almost
complete failure of the supervisory system –
both regarding rules and their enforcement.
Moreover, a lack of obedience to strict legal
norms and contracts has to be observed.
This is, in the medium term, the most
frightening aspect and should be kept in
mind before eagerly designing new rules.
When a government entity does not fulfill its
financial obligations (a “sovereign default”), 
it is in breach of the civil law governing the
respective contracts. In the European Union
such conduct also has to be judged according
to Article 126 (1) Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU): Member
States “shall avoid excessive government
deficits”. Although the wording leaves some
room for interpretation, a deficit which leads
to a default is certainly “excessive”. Hence a
“default” by a Member State is a breach of the
primary law of the Union. 
When creating the monetary union there was
a clear decision against establishing a general
equalization system or a specific support
mechanism for Member States with financial
problems. After extensive debate, a provision
was included in the Treaty which allowed the
European Council to grant financial assis-
tance to a Member State facing difficulties
caused by “natural disasters” or “exceptional
occurrences beyond its control” (Article 122
(2) TFEU). “Mutual assistance” may also be
granted to Member States via derogation
under certain circumstances (Article 143 (2)
TFEU). These clauses are exclusive: support
cannot be provided in any other way, other-
wise setting up intricate requirements for
granting aid would be useless.
The TFEU explicitly excludes any liability on
the part of the Union or any Member State
for the commitments of any other Member
State government or public sector entity. The
assumption of such commitments is also
legally excluded (Article 125 (1) TFEU). There
is some room for interpretation, as new pay-
ments or credit guarantees must not neces-
sarily be judged as “assuming” a commitment
(Herrmann 2010). Although Article 125
TFEU does not explicitly prohibit voluntary
financial aid by the Union or Member States,
it is often contended that this would change
the nature of the EU and jeopardize the basis
of the monetary union. A deviation from the
principles outlined would overstretch the
mandate given by the German legislature for
the transfer of sovereign powers to the EU
(Faßbender 2010). 
FISCAL SUPPORT MEASURES
On May 7, 2010, the International Monetary
Fund and the member states of the euro zone
agreed to grant credits and credit guarantees
on a bilateral basis to Greece. Whether this
aid complies with the principal provisions of
the TFEU is questionable. Article 122 (2)
could not serve as justification for this assis-
tance as it was not granted by the EU, and
Article 143 is not applicable. To justify it, 
the wording “assume the commitments” in
Article 125 (1) would have to be interpreted
in a way that new voluntary guarantees by
Member States are not covered by the inter-
diction of this article. 
A few days later, temporary support mecha-
nisms, the European Financial Stabilisation
BAILING OUT MEMBER STATES OF THE EU IS LEGALLY QUESTIONABLE
Helmut Siekmann
Goethe University
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Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), were set
up outside the framework of the Treaty –
again with considerable legal risk. The
EFSM is an EU instrument and was explicit-
ly based on Article 122 (2) TFEU. This can
be justified only under a very broad inter-
pretation of “exceptional occurrences beyond
(the) control” of Greece. The EFSF, techni-
cally a corporation under Luxem  bourg law,
is a separate entity set up by euro zone
states and not part of the EU. It is designed
as a special purpose vehicle to borrow
money on the capital markets by issuing
debt instruments guaranteed by euro zone
states not in need. The proceeds are then
passed on to the euro country in distress.
Although there is no direct financial sup-
port given by member states or the Union,
the provisions of EU primary law have to be
obeyed equally. Otherwise, an easy circum-
vention would be possible. This leads one 
to question whether Member States are free
to install a support mechanism outside 
the Treaty (see Thym 2011 for the argument
in favor).
Because of these legal concerns, a new clause
was inserted into the primary law: Article
136 (3) TFEU in April 2011, following the
simplified revision procedures of Article 48
(6) and (7) Treaty of the European Union
(TEU). It allows the Member States – not 
the EU – to grant financial aid under certain
restrictive conditions, thus legalizing the
planned permanent European Stability
Mechanism. On September 7, 2011, Germany’s
Federal Constitutional Court affirmed the
constitutionality of the present support pro-
grams but left the issue of compliance with
EU law open.
SUPPORT FROM CENTRAL BANKS
The European System of Central Banks
(ESCB) began to purchase debt instruments
issued by member states in summer 2010 and
stopped this about half a year later. It
resumed the program in summer 2011 by
buying Italian and Spanish debt instruments.
Today, a major share of the sovereign debt of
the supported member states or their respec-
tive banks is held by the ESCB. A “restruc-
turing” of sovereign debt would hit the ESCB
to a great extent.
From a legal point of view, any type of credit
financing of the Union or Member States by
the ECB or by a central bank of a Member
State is strictly prohibited. To secure this
interdiction, the ECB and national central
banks may not purchase any debt instruments
issued by the public sector. However, only a
“direct” purchase is forbidden in order to
allow open market interventions for mone-
tary reasons. In no way was it intended to
open a back door for the (indirect) financing
of governments or for easing their debt bur-
den. After more than a year, market malfunc-
tioning can hardly be used as a justification
any more. Specifically, in the case of Italy, the
bond buying program has to be judged as
legally not justifiable, since it provides fiscal
aid by lowering interest rates for government
bonds. It even prevents financial markets
from functioning properly and charging a
riskadjusted price for the refinancing of Italian
sovereign debt. This is a clear breach of the
legal basis of the monetary union.
REFERENCES
Faßbender, K. (2010)
“Der europäische 'Stabilisierungsmechanismus' im
Lichte von Unionsrecht und deutschemVerfassungs  -
recht”,
Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht, 
Vol. 13, pp. 799-803
Herrmann, C. (2010)
“Griechische Tragödie – der währungsverfassungs  -
rechtliche Rahmen für die Rettung, den Austritt
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der Eurozone”,
Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht,
Vol. 21, pp. 413-418
Thym, D. (2011)
“Euro-Rettungsschirm: zwischenstaatliche Rechts  -
konstruk  tion und verfassungsgerichtliche Kontrolle”,
Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht,
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The full article is available at:
www.eui.eu/Personal/Carletti/Life%20in%20
the%20Eurozone%20ebook.pdf
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Figure 1: Support Measures for indebted EU Member States
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MICROFINANCE AND ETHICS
F
or a long time, microfinance enjoyed
the reputation of being an ethically
valuable part of the international finan-
cial system. This reputation was reflected
and also reinforced by the 2006 Noble
Peace Prize that was awarded to the
microfinance pioneer Muhammad Yunus
and the Grameen Bank – the microfi-
nance institution (henceforth MFI) in
Bangladesh, which Yunus had founded
and represented for many years. Since
creating access to finance for thousands
of poor people is an important contribu-
tion to peace in this world, the prize was
well deserved. At first glance, it would
seem there is no reason for assessing
microfinance from an ethical perspec-
tive. This first impression is deceptive,
however. 
The first development projects of the 1970s
that aspired to create MFIs were driven by
good intentions. Their design was, however,
deficient in many ways, such that they did not
have the desired developmental and social
impact. Since none of the early MFIs could
cover their operating costs, they were all per-
manently dependent on foreign subsidies and
thus could not grow and offer their services
to more than just a handful of people. 
THE RISE OF “COMMERCIAL MICROFINANCE”
In the 1990s, it became evident that the old
approach to microfinance was not effective.
This insight led to the emergence of the so-
called “commercial approach” to microfi-
nance: MFIs began to limit their operating
costs, to make sure that loans were repaid,
and to set interest rates high enough such
that, after a short start-up phase, revenues
could cover costs. Soon, more and more MFIs
were set up that followed the commercial
approach. The interest rates they charged
rose, but were still much lower than those
charged by informal money lenders. 
The few MFIs that rejected the commercial
approach did not stay in operations for a long
time after the public subsidies ran out. The
most remarkable exception was the Grameen
Bank. Its charismatic leader Yunus managed
to raise sufficient international support, so
that his bank could operate in spite of costs
far in excess of revenues from operations.
Yunus attacked the commercial approach to
microfinance on ethical grounds. Making a
profit at the expense of the poor, he claimed,
was ethically not acceptable. 
This controversy – the dominant ethical 
conflict in the area of development finance in
the 1990s – reflects the old debate between
the “ethics of conviction” (Gesinnungsethik),
developed by the philosopher Immanuel
Kant two hundred years ago, and the “ethics
of responsibility” (Verantwortungsethik),
which was advocated about one hundred
years ago by the economist and sociologist
Max Weber. According to the Kantian view,
human action can only be classified as being
ethically valuable if it is based on sound ethical
principles and guided by ethically valuable
aspirations. According to Weber, human
action is only ethically valuable if careful
planning indicates that the actions under
consideration are the best available means to
achieve a situation that is itself desirable and
also ethically valuable. The position of Yunus
corresponds to that of Kant, while the new
mainstream of microfinance can be consid-
ered as being in line with Weber’s view. 
Reinhard H. Schmidt
Goethe University
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After the turn of the millennium, the recog-
nition that MFIs can be profitable attracted
the attention of new players that were only
interested in profit and felt no commitment
to the traditional developmental aspirations
of mic  ro  finance. The best known example 
of this new approach is the Mexican MFI
Com  par  tamos. In the year 2000, Com  par  ta  -
mos was converted from a non-profit organ-
ization into a profit oriented corporation. 
In the spring of 2007, only a few weeks
before the financial crisis broke out, about 
30 percent of Com  par  tamos shares were
issued to the general public. The IPO was
astonishingly successful. The price was
much higher than seemed justified in view
of the limited opportunities and aspirations 
that MFIs used to have with respect to 
their profitability. Compartamos though 
had been extremely profitable for many
years, having shown a return on book equi-
ty of 50 percent. 
Launching a successful IPO is, of course, not
ethically objectionable. However, Com  par  -
tamos’ profits had been due to interest rates to
borrowers in the range of almost 100 percent,
although full cost coverage would have been
possible with interest rates of around 30 per-
cent. The terms and conditions of the IPO can
be interpreted as an implicit promise of the
managers to stick with the high interest rate
policy – now supported by US-American hedge
funds and other profit oriented investors who
bought 40 percent of the issued shares. 
The IPO of the Indian micro-lender SKS in
the summer of 2010 was similarly success-
ful. In this case, however, the success was
not due to excessive interest rates, but to the
excessive growth of the SKS’ loan portfolio.
Over five years, SKS regularly doubled the
size of its loan portfolio. At the same time,
there were at least four other MFIs in the
South Indian state of Andhra Pradesh that
imitated the SKS strategy of rapid expansion
at any cost. In a fierce competitive battle
they were trying to steal clients from each
other, flooded them with oversized loans,
and finally led many of them to take on
much more debt than they could ever serv-
ice. As newspapers all over the world report-
ed, more than 80 clients of SKS and its com-
petitors committed suicide because they
could no longer bear their debt burden. 
A DIFFERENT WAY OF USING CAPITAL MARKETS   
As a lesson from these examples, it seems 
to me ethically unacceptable to transfer
power in MFIs to owners who cannot be
expected to have any concern for the social
and developmental impact of the microfi-
nance business. The former owners of
Compartamos and SKS could have foreseen
the consequences of transferring power to
profit oriented investors, but as it seems they
had given up pursuing an ethically acceptable
business policy long before the IPOs in order
to make their companies’ shares attractive to
the financial market. 
What makes matters worse from an ethical
standpoint is the fact that there are financial
instruments that allow MFIs to use the capi-
tal market as a source for raising new equity
without passing over power to the brute
forces of the capital market. However, in
order to find and use these instruments, one
needs the encouragement to act in a socially
responsible manner. Such an encourage-
ment can be taken from the kind of speech-
es that Yunus held for many years. The dis-
turbing recent developments in microfi-
nance suggest that, in spite of what Yunus’
critics argued, these “moralizing” speeches,
which emphasize ethical principles and good
intentions and leave out any reference to
hard “facts and figures”, are important. This
being said, it is clear that they cannot substi-
tute for the need to organize and manage
MFIs in a way that they can cover their full
economic costs. 
REFERENCES
Rosenberg, R. (2007)
“CGAP Reflections on the Compartamos Initial
Public Offering: A Case Study on Microfinance
Interest Rates and Profits”,
CGAP Focus Note 42 
The paper summarized here is forthcoming in 
the French Revue d’Économie Financière. It
extends and updates a line of reasoning first 
outlined in an article published in 2010 in the 
journal Poverty and Public Policy. 
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Figure 1: Credit volumes in the microfinance business in different regions
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ife insurances and pension scheme
products with a guaranteed interest
rate are important components of retire-
ment provisions – especially in Germany.
Quantitative impact studies conducted in
preparation for Solvency II reveal firstly
that these guarantees have a substantial
value, and secondly that their value is
subject to a large degree of interest rate
risk due to their long duration. Consider,
for example, a long low-interest period
during which the long-term guarantees
need to be maintained by investments in
short-term bonds. This situation creates a
risk for the life insurer when the interest
rate earned on the bonds does not cover
the guaranteed interest rate on the insur-
ance contracts
The interest rate risk can be managed either by
adequate structuring of the investments (dura-
tion matching) or by equity capital backing. In
practice, the duration of bonds that can be used
to “hedge” interest rate risk is usually signifi-
cantly shorter than the duration of the issued
guarantees. In the Solvency II standard model,
the resulting duration mismatch requires addi-
tional capital backing in the event of decreasing
interest rates. This is because lower interest
rates lead to higher present values of the insur-
er’s future benefit payments, which are the
main component of a life insurer’s liabilities.
The increase in technical provisions can be bal-
anced only if the interest rate risk is perfectly
managed. Generally, such a perfect match –
which would also imply giving up the upside
potential of interest rate changes – is not possi-
ble in the insurance industry.
INCENTIVES FOR INTEREST RATE MANAGEMENT
Thus, Solvency II sets strong incentives for
cautiously managing interest rate risk so as to
avoid an increase in technical provisions and
in required equity backing. A possible
response would be to issue guarantees that are
not binding in every single year, but only over
the entire contract period, which could allevi-
ate the capital requirements. Another alterna-
tive would be to issue guarantees that are lim-
ited in time and can be rolled over according
to a fixed scheme. This would reduce the dura-
tion of the guarantees and thus mitigate the
problem of a duration mismatch. A third
option could involve an increased demand by
insurers for fixed-rate securities with a con-
tract period of more than 30 years. This could
induce an increased supply of long-term sov-
ereign and corporate bonds.
These important developments, brought about
by Solvency II, are, however, constrained by
the existence of the so-called “countercyclical
premium”, formerly known as an “illiquidity
premium”. This premium signifies that, in times
of crisis, the European insurance supervision
applies higher (and less volatile) discount rates
for investment guarantees. This leads to a lower
present value of the guarantees and can dimin-
ish the need to raise capital. The idea behind the
countercyclical premium is to reduce pro-cycli-
cality by not revealing the (temporary) financial
distress of a life insurer. While this is, indeed, an
advantage, there are also several severe disad-
vantages. By employing a countercyclical pre-
mium, the regulator deviates from market-con-
sistent valuation, which is an important build-
ing block of Solvency II. When crises do not
become readily apparent, providers of invest-
ment guarantees have less incentive to actively
manage their interest rate risk. In some situa-
tions, a company that perfectly manages its
interest rate risk might even have to report an
inferior solvency situation compared to an oth-
erwise identical company lacking perfect inter-
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LONG-TERM GUARANTEES AND THE COUNTERCYCLICAL PREMIUM
UNDER SOLVENCY II
Helmut Gründl 
Goethe-University
Hato Schmeiser 
IVW, University of St. Gallen
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uct innovations mentioned above might be less
appealing, with one result being a lower
demand for long-term bonds.
Furthermore, the specific problems for the
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions
Authority (EIOPA) that arise from determining
a countercyclical premium must be addressed.
Policymakers as well as industry representatives
may pressure EIOPA to introduce, increase, or
not decrease the countercyclical premium. Even
EIOPA itself might find it difficult to decrease a
premium granted before, knowing that decreas-
ing it could adversely affect insurers’ solvency
situation.
ADAPTATION OF CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS TO
MARKET SITUATION
Nevertheless, as a basic principle, we fully sup-
port the idea of introducing countercyclical ele-
ments into Solvency II. We believe it would be
better, however, to define good and bad market
scenarios (based on interest rates and the stock
market) and then adapt the capital require-
ments to the prevailing situation. Capital
requirements should be stricter in boom times
and less strict in times of crisis. For example, if
insurers experience a boom year with high
profits, the maximum default probability
should be set to lower than 0.5% so that the
company is forced to retain some of the profits
for times when the financial situation is deteri-
orating. Conversely, during times when insur-
ers suffer losses due to adverse capital market
developments, the regulatory requirements
could be loosened (e.g., by allowing a default
probability of up to 1%). Insurers will then
avoid having to sell shares in a falling market.
Without such a countercyclical element insur-
ance companies will have to sell stocks in a
falling market because capital buffers fall con-
temporaneously with stock prices. 
Insurers will likely invest in fewer shares and
more safely, to reduce capital requirements. An
obvious consequence of insurance companies
investing less in stocks is that overall demand for
stocks declines, leading to an even greater
decrease in stock prices. Another consequence of
selling shares during bad times is that the insurer
will have to pay more to buy the stock back at a
later time, which will be detrimental to the insur-
er’s stakeholders. Thus, countercyclical require-
ments could reduce the acceleration of a crisis
without having to deviate from an established set
of rules. Fortunately, there is still time left to
address some of the fundamental problems of
Solvency II, the advantages and disadvantages of
a countercyclical premium being one of them.
The full article is available at: 
www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de/images/
policy_platform/Long_Term_Guarantees
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For further information on the Policy Platform at the House of Finance and to
download our publications please refer to our website:
http://www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de/policy_platform
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“ECONOMISTS MUST TAKE MORE ACCOUNT OF ETHICAL ASPECTS”
Michael Meister is the Deputy Chair of
the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the
Deutscher Bundestag. His key areas of
focus are financial economics, tax policy
and the federal budget. A former student
of TU Darmstadt, he received his doctor-
al degree in mathematics in 1988. On
October 4, he talked to a select group of
HoF scholars about current financial top-
ics, as a guest of the House of Finance
Policy Platform.
Is the current discussion on a deepening of
the European Economic Union aimed in the
first instance at calming financial markets?
Or do you believe that EU Member States
have a firm will to further European inte-
gration? 
The European monetary union was instituted
without a sufficiently integrated fiscal and
economic policy. This is a shortcoming we
have to rectify. Considering the possibly far-
reaching consequences, a further deepening
of the European Economic Union can cer-
tainly not be discussed only against the
background of the current crisis. The process
of further integration must answer to the
fundamental question of what is in the best
interest of the European people. There are
many aspects that have to be taken into con-
sideration here. However, the current crisis
is an opportunity to pursue these questions
more rigorously. In my opinion, we need a
further deepening of the eurozone that is
based on contractual agreements. This is
necessary not only for Europe to hold its
ground in world trade, but also to extend
the options for joint action before and 
within times of crises. EU Member States
cannot leave these policy areas that gen-
uinely belong within the national sphere of
competencies to the European Com  mission.
This would contradict their participation
rights. Therefore, we need to consider setting
up a democratically legitimized European
economic government.
Which national competencies could be handed
over to the European Union?
I believe that we should not be discussing
handing over competencies from the nation-
al to the European level in isolation. Before
European integration is deepened by an
increase in the competencies of Brussels, we
have to answer several questions, for
instance: For which competencies can we
expect European institutions to fare better
than EU member states individually? Which
European body is best suited for fulfilling
which common responsibility? And can this
body claim democratic legitimacy? In
Germany, we must also observe the deci-
sions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht
(Federal Consti  tu  tional Court). All these
questions cannot be answered without tak-
ing into consideration the overall context. 
Should banks be required to extend their
Tier 1 capital to account for holdings of 
public debt?
Yes, we have to come to a change in this
respect. The crisis has shown that government
bonds are not as safe as we previously
thought. However, we have to choose the
right timing for implementing such a measure.
What do you consider the most pressing
questions for academia with regard to the
current financial crisis?
Thinking about how to optimally regulate
financial markets is necessary and appropriate.
We have to restrict financial markets to their
original purpose of serving the real economy.
In addition to this, I believe that the values
of the social market economy have to be
given more attention again − also in eco-
nomic research. We will not avoid further
crises by simply extending regulation.
Economists must take more account of the
ethical and moral aspects of economic activ-
ities. I firmly believe that economic ques-
tions cannot be considered in depth without
deliberating on social issues. 
Michael Meister   
11 HOF-Newsletter  07.12.11  13:53  Seite 1213
Selected HoF Publications • HoF-Newsletter • Quarter 4/2011
SELECTED HOUSE OF FINANCE PUBLICATIONS
Baums, T., Drinhausen, F., Keinath, A.
(2011) 
“Anfechtungsklagen und Freigabeverfahren.
Eine empirische Studie”,  
forthcoming in ZIP - Zeitschrift für Wirt  schafts  -
recht 
Beck, R., Schott, K., Gregory, R. (2011) 
“Mindful Management Practices in Global
Multi-Vendor ISD Outsourcing Projects”,  
forthcoming in Scandinavian Journal of
Information Systems (SJIS)
Bhattacharya, U., Hackethal, A., Kaesler, S.,
Loos, B., Meyer, S. (2011) 
“Do Retail Investors Benefit from Unbiased
Advice? Results from a large Field Experiment”,
forthcoming in Review of Financial Studies 
Blonski, M., Ockenfels, P., Spagnolo, G.
(2011) 
“Equilibrium Selection in the Repeated Priso  -
ner's Dilemma: Axiomatic Approach and
Experi  mental”,  
American Economic Journal: Micro  econo  mics,
Vol. 3, pp. 164-192
Campolmi, A., Faia, E., Winkler, R. (2011) 
“Fiscal Calculus and the Labour Market”, 
forthcoming in B.E. Journal in Macro  eco  nomics
(Contributions)
Fuchs-Schündeln, N., Izem, R. (2011) 
“Explaining the Low Labor Productivity in
East Germany – A Spatial Analysis”,  
forthcoming in Journal of Comparative
Economics
Gomber, P., Lutat, M., Haferkorn, M.,
Zimmermann, K. (2011) 
“Circuit Breakers – Evidence on Trading
Migra  tion in Fragmented Markets”,  
forthcoming in BIT – Banking and Infor  -
mation Technology 
Haar, B. (2011) 
“Der Widerruf des Beitritts zu einem Immo  bi  -
lienfonds – zum Spannungsverhältnis zwischen
Verbraucherschutz und institutionellem Anle  -
gerschutz”,  
Bechtold, S. et al. (eds.), Recht, Ordnung und
Wettbewerb, pp. 1159-1173
Hackethal, A., Haliassos, M., Jappelli, T.
(2011) 
“Financial Advisors: A Case of Babysitters?”,  
forthcoming in Journal of Banking and Finance
Hirsch, J., Walz, U. (2011) 
“Why Do Contracts Differ between Venture
Capital Types?”,  
forthcoming in Small Business Economics
Hoffmann, F., Inderst, R. (2011) 
“Pre-sale Information”,  
forthcoming in Journal of Economic Theory
Kraft, H., Seifried, F., Steffensen, M. (2011)
“Consumption-Portfolio Optimization with
Recursive Utility in Incomplete Markets”,  
forthcoming in Finance and Stochastics 
Langenbucher, K. (2011) 
“Aktien und Kapitalmarktrecht”,  
2
nd, revised edition, Verlag C.H. Beck
Schmitt, P., Skiera, B., Van den Bulte, C.
(2011) 
“Referral Programs and Customer Value”,  
Journal of Marketing, Vol. 75, Issue 1, 46-59
Siekmann, H. (2011) 
Kommentierung von Abschnitt VIIIa (Art. 91a
bis Art. 91e) und Abschnitt X (Art. 104a bis
115) sowie Art. 88, 120, 120a, 125c, 143c und
143d des Grundgesetzes,  
Michael Sachs (ed.), Grundgesetz, 6. Auflage,
München
Wandt, M. (2011) 
Kommentierungen der VVG §§ 108 (Haft  -
pflicht  versicherung), 163, 164 (Lebens  ver  -
sicherung),
Langheid, T., Wandt, M. (eds.), Münchener
Kommentar zum Versicherungsvertragsgesetz,
2. Vol., pp. 236-279, 1472-1529
Wieland, V. (2011) 
“Model Comparison and Robustness: A Proposal
for Policy Analysis after the Financial Crisis”,
forthcoming in Solow, R., Touffut J.-P. (eds.),
“What's Right with Macroeconomics?”, Edward
Elgar Publishing
11 HOF-Newsletter  07.12.11  13:53  Seite 13FIRST MAJOR DONATION FOR THE HOUSE OF FINANCE FOUNDATION
The House of Finance Foundation received its
first major donation on November 8 when Josef
Ackermann, Chairman of the Management Board
of Deutsche Bank, presented a check for 3 million
euros to Werner Müller-Esterl, the President of
Goethe University. This check was given on behalf
of the Deutsche Bank Stiftung, which plans to
provide 10 million euros in total to the newly
established foundation over the coming years.
Müller-Esterl expressed his thanks to the donor: “The House of Finance Foundation enables us
to appoint further top scholars who will help the House of Finance to strengthen its competitive
position in international science”. The Foundation is dedicated to promoting research, teaching
and knowledge transfer at the House of Finance. Up until now, Goethe University has been able to
raise 21 million euros towards its capital stock. Donors include B. Metzler, DekaBank, Deutsche
Vermögensberatung AG, DZ BANK, Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft, Helaba
Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen and UBS. The University’s Sponsorship Code ensures the inde-
pendence of all research and teaching activities.
NEWS IN BRIEF
• Michael Binder, Professor of International
Macro  economics and Macroeconometrics, is
the new representative of the Department of
Money and Macroeconomics in the House of
Finance Executive Committee. He replaces
Stefan Gerlach who joined the Central Bank
of Ireland as Deputy Governor in September.
• Ester Faia, Professor of Monetary and Fiscal
Policy, has been appointed a consultant to the
European Central Bank. She will work on the
project “Modeling the interaction between
banks and the real economy and the connec-
tion between the banking system and the
sovereign debt crisis”.
• Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) has
assigned priority program grants to Ester Faia,
Jan Pieter Krahnen and Michalis Haliassos
as principal investigators. The research teams
of Faia and Krahnen will work jointly on the
project “Debt Market Imperfections and Mac  -
ro  economic Impli  ca  tions”, whilst Haliassos’
team will work on “Implications of Financial
Market Imper  fections for Wealth and Debt
Accumulation in the Household Sector”.
• Holger Kraft, Professor of Asset Pricing, has
been appointed Associate Editor of the Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control.
• Robert Gregory, formerly a scholar at the 
E-Finance Lab, has been awarded the disser-
tation prize of the Alcatel-Lucent Stiftung 
for his thesis on the management of IT 
offshoring projects (supervised by Roman
Beck and Wolfgang König).
• Nikolaus Bunting, a Research Assistant 
at the chair of Theodor Baums, has received
a prize from the Stiftung Hessischer Wirt  -
schafts  prüfer for his paper “Das Früh  er  -
kennungs  system des § 91 Abs. 2 AktG in der
Prüfungspraxis – Eine kritische Be  trach  tung
des IDW PS 340”.
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LUCAS PAPADEMOS APPOINTED
PRIME MINISTER OF GREECE
Lucas Papademos, a Senior
Fellow of the Center for
Financial Studies (CFS), was
appointed Prime Minister of
Greece on November 10. The
CFS congratulated him, noting
that “the considerable exper  tise of Professor
Papademos, both in the academic and in the
policy sphere, together with the constructive
attitude that we have all witnessed since 
he joined us as a Senior Fellow, will be very
important for the conduct of his duties in these
turbulent times for Europe”. Papademos was
Vice-President of the Euro  pean Central Bank
from 2002 to 2010.
SPECIAL BIRTHDAY CELEBRATIONS FOR WOLFGANG KÖNIG 
On October 5, the House of Finance celebrated the
60
th birthday of its Executive Director, Wolfgang
König (also head of the Chair of Business
Administration, especially Information Systems).
To mark the occasion, his (current and former)
doctoral students organized a colloquium entitled
“The role of IT in the financial crisis: standards as a general purpose weapon or a fire accelerant?”
Lectures had a scientific or industrial background and were presented, among others, by
University of Michigan faculty plus representatives from Deutsche Bank, IBM and INTARGIA. In
the evening, Goethe University and Frankfurt Main Finance hosted a special reception in the
foyer of the House of Finance. More than 200 guests celebrated König’s birthday following speech-
es by Thomas Schäfer, the Finance Minister of the State of Hessen, Petra Roth, the Mayor of the
City of Frankfurt and Otmar Issing, President of the Board of Trustees for the House of Finance.
ANDREAS HACKETHAL NOW A
MEMBER OF THE EXCHANGE
EXPERTS COMMISSION
Andreas Hackethal, Professor of
Finance at the House of Finan  -
ce and the new Dean of Goethe
University’s Faculty of Eco  no  -
mics and Business Admi    ni  stra  -
tion, has been appointed a
mem  ber of the Exchange Experts Commis  sion
located at the Deutsche Börse Group. The Com  -
mission, which consists of representatives of in  -
vestor protection associations, banks, insurance
and investment companies, stock exchan  ges,
industry, Deutsche Bundesbank and academia,
advises the German Federal Ministry of Finance
on policy issues related to the capital markets.
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QUARTERLY EVENT CALENDAR
Wednesday, 8
th Finance Brown Bag Seminar 
12 pm – 1 pm “Asset Returns, Different Portfolio
Strategies and the Dynamic
Characteristics of the Weighted Asset
Returns”
Speaker: Yulya Plyakha
Thursday, 16
th Frankfurt Seminar in Macroeconomics
12.15 pm – 1.15 pm Speaker: Marco Del Negro, New York Fed
Friday, 24
th Conference 
“Life Insurance Products under
Solvency II”
Organizers: International Center for
Insurance Regulation, Munich Risk and
Insurance Center, German Association of
Insurance Sciences
Wednesday, 29
th CFS Colloquium  
5.30 pm “Über Erfahrungen mit und Visionen
für den öffentlich-rechtlichen
Bankensektor”  
Speaker: Gerd Häusler
MARCH
Friday, 16
th – CFS Conference Event 
Saturday, 17
th – International Research Forum on 
9 am – 6 pm Monetary Policy – seventh conference
Please refer to www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de/eventlist.html
for continuous updates of the event calendar.
Please note that for some events registration is compulsory.
JANUARY
Monday, 9
th EFL Jour Fixe 
5 pm “Leveraging Social Capital in The
Virtual Work Environment –
Knowledge Exchange Through Social
Media Platforms”
Speaker: Immanuel Pahlke
Wednesday, 11
th Finance Brown Bag Seminar
12 pm – 1 pm  “The Quality of Datastream and CRSP
for German Corporations: Biased or
only erroneous?”
Speaker: Stephan Späthe
Tuesday, 17
th Finance Seminar
5.15 pm  Speaker: Sven Rady, LMU Munich
Wednesday, 18
th Finance Brown Bag Seminar 
12 pm – 1 pm “Private Equity Shareholder Activism”
Speaker: Christian Rauch
Friday, 20
th – IMFS/LEMF Conference 
Saturday, 21
st – “Retail Financial Services after the
Crisis: Legal and Economic Perspectives
on Investor and Consumer Protection”
Co-oorganized by Brigitte Haar (LEMF)
and Roman Inderst (IMFS)
Tuesday, 24
th Finance Seminar
5.15 pm  Speaker: Álvaro Cartea, 
Carlos III University of Madrid
Thursday, 26
th HoF Brown Bag Seminar 
12 pm – 1 pm “Taxation and labor supply of married
females: a cross-country analysis”
Speaker: Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln
Thursday, 26
th Frankfurt Seminar in Macroeconomics
12.15 pm – 1.15 pm Speaker: Samad Sarferaz, ETH Zurich
Tuesday, 31
st Finance Seminar
5.15 pm  Speaker: Markus Leippold, 
Swiss Banking Institute
FEBRUARY
Wednesday, 1
st Finance Brown Bag Seminar  
12 pm – 1 pm “Information Asymmetry around
Operational Loss Announcements in
U.S. Financial Firms”  
Speaker: Ahmed Barakat
Thursday, 2
nd Frankfurt Seminar in Macroeconomics 
12.15 pm – 1.15 pm Speaker: Martin Ellison, 
University of Oxford
Monday, 6
th EFL Jour Fixe 
5 pm “Der Effekt des Wetters auf das
Handelsverhalten privater Anleger”
Speaker: Steffen Meyer
Tuesday, 7
th Finance Seminar
5.15 pm Speaker: Claudio Tebaldi, 
University Bocconi, Milano
Tuesday, 7
th EFL Spring Conference 2012
2 pm – 6 pm “Cloud Computing in the Financial
Industry – A Security and Compliance
Nightmare?”
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